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Recipients of intergroup apologies have been found to prefer expressions of shame over guilt. 
However, there is little research comparing the responses of a wronged group with those of a 
blamed group. Kenyans/Britons evaluated guilt/shame statements about colonialism, with 
blame measured as the assignment of collective guilt to Britain. Amongst Britons, there was a 
significant interaction, with high ingroup blamers expecting more reconciliation from shame 
than from guilt, and vice versa for low ingroup blamers. Amongst Kenyans, there was no 
main effect of blame, but more reconciliation was expected from shame than from guilt. 
Wronged groups thus appear to prefer shame over guilt, whereas preference for guilt/shame 
amongst members of a blamed group depends on the level of ingroup blame. 
 

















Reconciliation Responses, Blame and Expressions of Guilt or Shame  
 
The historical legacy of Britain’s colonization of Kenya has recently become a matter 
of controversy. Fueling a re-examination of British colonialism in Kenya, historian Caroline 
Elkins’ (2005) Pulitzer-Prize-winning book compared Britain’s practices to those in gulags in 
Stalinist Russia, while a BBC documentary (2002) showed Kenyan interviewees recounting 
gruesome experiences such as genital mutilation, gouging of eyes, rape, and murder. These 
sources alleged that the practices were officially sanctioned by “the Colonial Administration 
and the British Government” (BBC, 2002b). Against this backdrop, human rights lawyers and 
the Kenya Human Rights Commission have recently filed a law suit against the British 
government on the basis of this research (KHRC, 2009). Nonetheless, there has been no 
official British apology to Kenya for colonial atrocities.  
This ongoing process highlights the differences between Kenyans and Britons in 
blaming Britain for colonialism. British public responses to the recent wave of media 
attention have also involved differing amounts of collective in-group blame. For instance, in 
the documentary, one British former colonial official in Kenya defended the brutality that 
took place during colonialism, while another said: “What went on in the Kenya camps and 
villages was brutal, savage torture… I feel ashamed to have come from a Britain that did what 
it did here” (in BBC 2002b). Apparently, blaming of Britain for colonialism can determine 
beliefs about the appropriate emotional response.  
Another consequence of these differences in blame might be a difference between how 
citizens of the two countries evaluate the emotional content of a collective apology from 
Britain to Kenya. Based on previous research, we predicted that a British person who accepts 
less collective blame than a Kenyan would assign to Britain would view a British apology 




expressed with guilt, rather than shame, to be more effective in leading to reconciliation. On 
the other hand, a Kenyan or a British person who accepts collective blame for the atrocities 
would be more optimistic about an apology expressed with shame.  
Blame, Guilt, and Shame  
When one group wrongs another, people in a wronged group blame the perpetrators to 
different degrees (Giner-Sorolla, Kamau & Castano, in press; Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel & 
Fischer, 2007). People in a perpetrating group also blame their own group to different degrees 
(Brown et al. 2008; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2009). Blaming one’s own group involves 
accepting collective responsibility and considering that members of the group should feel bad. 
The negative emotions of shame and guilt have been studied as appropriate responses 
to intergroup wrongdoing (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Giner-Sorolla et al., in press; see also 
Brown et al., 2008; Lickel et al., 2005). Shame has been defined as an emotion corresponding 
to a global negative evaluation of the self, or to concerns about one’s moral image, while guilt 
corresponds to a negative evaluation of one’s actions (e.g. Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy 
& Robins, 2006; Smith et al., 2002). Research on the reception of shame and guilt in a 
collective apology has found that shame leads to more positive reactions overall than guilt; 
also, shame reduces the insult taken when an offer of compensation accompanies the apology 
(Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008). Further research has shown that when people differ in their blame 
of the apologizing party, the ability of shame to reduce insult taken from compensation is 
strongest for those who blame the apologizing party most strongly (Giner-Sorolla et al., 
2010). These results argue against the position that shame is always less adaptive than guilt 
because studies showing this (e.g. Tangney & Dearing, 2002) consider the outcomes for 
individuals, but not for recipients in the larger social context. In a social situation where 
appeasement is seen as appropriate, an expression of shame can defuse the insult taken from a 




gesture of reconciliation, and be satisfying by itself. Shame can therefore be more socially 
adaptive than guilt, especially if the wrongdoing is at the group level and if the shame is 
expressed collectively.  
The present research extended previous results in several ways. Most importantly, we 
investigated under what circumstances a person will prefer shame over guilt when the ingroup 
apologizes for wrongs against an outgroup. We took as our focal population British citizens 
presented with an apology toward ex-colonies. We thought that this sample would vary in 
collective blame assigned to Britain, and that  those high in collective blame would prefer a 
shame apology over a guilt apology, as a more convincing expression of negative self-
conscious feelings. As a comparison population thought to be high in blame, we looked at a 
Kenyan sample; this population was expected to show a clearer preference for a shame 
apology.  
This approach suggests the use of a measure oriented toward expectations of 
reconciliation; while it is possible for both populations to feel satisfaction but not approach 
each other, it is more important for both sides to share positive expectations of reconciliation, 
in order for reconciliation to actually happen. Thus, our main dependent measure deals with 
expectations of reconciliation from an apology. Another difference from previous research is 
that previous research in this area has manipulated the expression of shame versus guilt with 
an extended description of the appraisal and action tendencies theoretically accompanying 
each emotion. In this research we present merely the terms “shame” and “guilt,” a move 
towards greater precision and face validity of the manipulation
1
.  
Giner-Sorolla et al. (2008) argued that shame from an outgroup member is seen as 
better relative to guilt, because shame suggests an abasement of the outgroup, and shows 
stronger feelings of self-blame. We therefore expected Kenyans to expect more reconciliation 




from shame rather than guilt expressed by Britain about colonialism. Predictions for Britons, 
however, were more complicated; studies to date have not looked at the role of emotions in 
expectations about an ingroup’s reaction to an apology directed at another group. However, 
basing our predictions upon Giner-Sorolla et al.’s (2010) findings about judgments of 
outgroup-to-ingroup apologies, we expected that Britons’ preferences would depend on the 
extent to which they blamed the ingroup. High ingroup-blaming Britons may show a pattern 
similar to Kenyans, seeing shame expressions as more effective than guilt expressions. 
However, low ingroup-blamers may believe that guilt is more appropriate than shame, 
implying a less negative account of wrongdoing for the ingroup. Guilt restricts the scope of 
bad feelings; rather than blaming the whole ingroup, guilt focuses on the wrongness of a 
single act. Low ingroup-blamers would thus be more likely to believe that a guilt-based 
apology will be appropriate and effective. If, as we expect, Kenyans as a group show more 
blame toward the British than most British do, then this can also explain why Kenyans, like 
British high ingroup-blamers, would prefer shame over guilt. 
Hypotheses 
We predicted an interaction between group blame and guilt/shame in predicting 
anticipated intergroup reconciliation. For Kenyans, we expected higher anticipated 
reconciliation from shame than from guilt overall, due to this group’s high amount of blame. 
For Britons, we expected higher anticipated reconciliation from guilt than from shame, 
especially amongst Britons reporting low ingroup blame levels.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Kenyans (N=82) aged 18-46 years (M=25.47) were recruited in the capital Nairobi 
and randomly assigned to either a guilt condition (N=41) or a shame condition (N=41). They 




were recruited from a university cafeteria and a number of leisure areas such as park grounds 
and a social club. Of those who indicated their sex 35 were male and 42 were female.  
British participants were 68 psychology students recruited in England, aged 18-47 
years (M=20.04). Participants were randomly assigned to either a guilt condition (N=36) or a 
shame condition (N=32). Of those who indicated their sex, there were 6 males and 60 
females.  
Procedure and materials 
All participants read an introduction describing the extent of colonialism, which was 
similar for both groups, but focused on Kenya for Kenyan participants, and focused on all 
former British colonies for British participants. They were then asked to imagine an 
apologetic statement for colonialism offered by Britain on behalf of all British people. 
Kenyans were asked: “Imagine if Britain makes the following statement on behalf of all 
British people who took part in colonialism” and Britons were asked: “Imagine if Britain 
makes the following statement on behalf of all British people who took part in colonialism, 
directing the statement at countries that Britain colonized”. Following that was the statement 
of the emotion.
1
 Emotion was varied only by inserting either the term “guilt” or “ashamed” 
into the sentence “We British people feel ___”.  
Each sample then filled out a measure of expected reconciliation, for which we 
adapted Aron, Aron and Smollan’s (1992) pictorial Inclusion-of-Other-in-Self (IOS) scale to 
measure expected closeness between Britain and the target of the apology. Britons were asked 
“How close would Britons and Britain’s ex-colonies be as a result of the statement? Choose 
one diagram” and Kenyans were asked “How close would Kenyans and Britons be as a result 
of the statement? Choose one diagram.” In Aron et al.’s original scale, the scale has 7 pairs of 
circles that vary in closeness. We presented 7 pairs of circles identical to Aron et al.’s original 




measure, only that the relations we measured were intergroup rather than interpersonal. In our 
adaptation the circle on the left-hand of each pair was labelled with the participant’s national 
group (rather than ‘self’ as in Aron et al.) and the circle on the right-hand of each pair was 
labelled with the participant’s national outgroup (rather than ‘other’). Therefore Kenyans 
were presented with the left-hand circle in each pair labelled ‘Kenyans’ and the right-hand 
circle in each pair labelled ‘Britons’. Britons were presented with the left-hand circle in each 
pair labelled ‘Britons’ and the right-hand circle in each pair labelled ‘ex-colonies’. The first 
pair of circles (not inter-linked) indicated no closeness, the second pair of circles indicated 
(slightly inter-linked) indicated some closeness, and so on until the seventh pair of circles 
(closely inter-linked) indicating maximum closeness between one’s respective ingroup and 
the outgroup.  
After this, participants completed 10 items adapted from the Branscombe et al. (2004) 
Collective Guilt Scale (the 2 subscales used concerned the assignment of collective 
guilt/responsibility). They were adapted so that they measured assignment of blame to Britain 
whether from the point of view of the British or other people. Sample items are: “All British 
people should feel guilty because of colonialism in Kenya,” “British people as a group should 
not be held responsible for the actions of British colonialists,” (reverse-coded) “I hold all 
British people responsible for colonialism in Kenya.” Responses were based on a 0-100% 5-
point response-scale. Cronbach’s α was .64 among the Kenyan sample and .69 among the 
British, suggesting a reasonable internal reliability level. 
Results 
There was no significant effect of emotion on assigned blame - for Kenyans, 
F(1,77)=1.45, ns; for Britons, F(1,66)<1, ns. This shows that blame was orthogonal to the 
emotion condition, justifying the use of the two in a crossed design. As expected, Kenyans 




assigned significantly more blame to Britain (M=52.03, SD=17.0) than Britons did (M=39.22, 
SD=14.08), a difference that was significant, F(1,145)=24.27, p=.001. A Briton who was one 
standard deviation above the mean (i.e., a score of 53.30) could be said to have a level of 
blame similar to that of the average Kenyan (52.03). 
Separate general linear models for each sample then tested the main and interaction 
effects of emotion (guilt, coded -1, or shame, coded 1) and blame (as a continuous variable, 
centred within each sample) on expected reconciliation.  
In the Kenyan sample (Figure 1), there was a marginally significant main effect of 
emotion F(1,74)=3.24, p=.08, η2=.04, such that shame led to more expected reconciliation 
(M=3.63, SD=1.74) than guilt (M=2.87, SD=1.63). There was no significant main effect of 
blame on reconciliation and no significant interaction effect, F(1,74)<1, ns.  
In the British sample (Figure 2) there was a marginally significant main effect of 
ingroup blame, F(1,64)=2.94, p=.091, η2=.044; β=-.02, SE=.01; no significant main effect of 
emotion, F(1,64)<1,ns; and a significant interaction effect, F(1,64)=5.52, p=.02, η2=.08. 
Britons who assigned low blame to the ingroup expected more reconciliation from guilt than 
from shame, as shown by a negative β coefficient of the simple effect of emotion at 1 SD 
below the mean of blame: β= -0.77, t(64)= -1.99, p=.05. Conversely, those who assigned high 
blame to the ingroup (mean + 1SD) tended to expect more reconciliation from shame than 
from guilt: β = 0.54, t(64)=1.41, p =.16.  
Discussion 
In these findings, members of the British national group showed variation in their 
evaluative responses to shame versus guilt expressions in a British collective apology, 
depending on their level of ingroup blame. High ingroup-blamers responded similarly to 
members of the recipient group (Kenyans) in expecting more positive outcomes from a shame 




expression than from guilt. Low ingroup-blamers, however, expected more positive outcomes 
from a guilt expression than from shame. The implication is that preference for shame over 
guilt is a question of not so much one’s own group membership (Briton or Kenyan) as how 
much blame one ascribes to Britain as the perpetrator group. Kenyans expected more 
reconciliation from shame than from guilt because their blaming of Britain for colonialism 
was high.  
We should also note that the collective guilt scale we used to measure blame included 
a number of measures of the assignment of guilt and guilt feelings. However, these results are 
not tautological; British respondents who responded with high scores on the collective guilt 
scale actually showed a preference for the shame over guilt expression, whereas those who 
responded low preferred the guilt over shame expression. This apparent paradox can be 
resolved by observing that the collective guilt scale does not explicitly contrast guilt feelings 
against feelings of shame. Indeed, because shame has been characterized as a more strongly 
felt and more self-condemning emotion than guilt (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002), people 
who agree that the British should feel guilty may respond more favourably even to an 
expression of shame than to an expression of guilt, because shame is a stronger emotion that 
communicates a greater amount of compunction. This seems to be the most reasonable 
explanation for the apparent disconnection between the emotions our British participants think 
their own group should feel, and the emotions they think their own group should express. 
Our results also partially support those of Giner-Sorolla et al. (2010) in showing a 
tendency for the victim group to expect overall more positive outcomes from shame than from 
guilt. However, we did not find a significant interaction between blame and emotion amongst 
Kenyans, as the previous research did among Black British people considering an apology for 
police discrimination. It may simply be the case that given the high blame of Britain in the 




Kenyan sample, responsibility for the act was not in question, and shame was universally 
preferred over guilt. Aside from similarities in their levels of blame, future research ought to 
explore the reasons for the similarity observed between Kenyans and high ingroup-blaming 
Britons. Both groups expected shame to lead to more reconciliation than guilt. One 
explanation for this may be that collectivist self-construal was activated in both.  
Interestingly, higher collectivism in a culture has been associated with favourable 
responses to shame (e.g. Stipek, 1998), probably because of shame’s capacity to restore 
harmonious social relations. Studies of East African cultures and of Kenya in particular have 
shown a relatively higher level of collectivism compared to Western countries (Hofstede, 
1983; Ma & Schoeneman, 1997) However, there is also evidence that collectivism and 
individualism are orthogonal constructs that co-exist in every society (e.g. Heine et al. 2002) 
and evidence also shows that either type of self-construal can be primed by situational factors. 
For instance, collectivism can be primed through evoking group scenarios or imagined group 
tasks (see a meta-analysis by Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Asking people to evaluate group 
statements, then, may have primed our participants’ collectivist self-construal and made them 
consider the social (rather than individual) outcomes of the emotion expressed. Reminders of 
a collective context within even the British culture therefore could have been effective in 
promoting a preference for shame expressions over guilt, among those who accepted blame 
for colonialism. Further research is needed to explore whether high blaming of the 
ingroup/outgroup is associated with more effective priming of collectivist sentiments such as 
being more concerned about the impact of the emotion for group harmony. 
The concept of expected reconciliation needs to be investigated further. Further details 
of this process are suggested by Self-Categorization Theory’s meta-contrast principle (Turner 
et al. 1987), which tells us how people weigh the similarities and differences between 




themselves and others in a situation, in order to decide whether to categorize the latter as 
ingroup members. Reconciliation between Britain and ex-colonies may involve an increase in 
the salience (that is, psychological importance) of the categories uniting them such as the 
Commonwealth, or a decrease in the perceived psychological distance between the two 
categories. The IOS measure that we used implies the latter, but there is still the possibility of 
a superordinate category becoming more salient as part of reconciliation. For example this 
would mean that, through the meta-contrasts that lead to categorization, strengthening 
perceptions of cultural similarities between Britons and Kenyans/ex-colonies should promote 
reconciliation between the two. The consequences of reconciliation for intergroup forgiveness 
also need to be explored. Forgiveness may depend on successful reconciliation between the 
groups involved, since Wohl and Branscombe (2005) had found that inclusive categorization 
encompassing both the perpetrator and wronged groups promoted forgiveness.  
In conclusion, our findings suggest that high collective ingroup-blamers have a similar 
point of view to members of a wronged group, in terms of viewing shame as more beneficial 
than guilt for intergroup reconciliation. In other words, those who deny responsibility for 
wrongdoing may end up supporting apologies couched in the terms of guilt rather than shame, 
which to a wronged outgroup may end up appearing unsatisfactory, especially when 
accompanied with offers of material aid (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008). Only by accepting 
collective responsibility might ingroup members end up seeing eye-to-eye with members of 
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 1. We expected Kenyans to have familiarity with guilt and shame as separate 
emotions not just from English, but also from Kiswahili (both are Kenya’s lingua franca). In 
Kiswahili, the word for shame is aibu (used to describe circumstances of disgrace, scandal 
and embarrassment), and is not interchangeable with the word for guilt, hatia (used to 
describe legal culpability, being guilty). Dictionary definitions of the noun hatia allude to 
legal culpability (e.g. ‘crime, sin, be accused’) as do English dictionary definitions of the 
noun guilt (e.g. ‘committed offense, crime, violation of law’). However, adding ‘to have’ to 
hatia (kuwa na hatia, is synonymous with ‘(to feel) guilty’ in English, making the Kiswahili 
meaning similar to the English meaning in verb form. We expected Kenyans to respond to 
English guilt/shame statements in the same way that they might respond to statements 
presented in Kiswahili. We therefore presented the same guilt/shame statements in English to 
both the Kenyan and British participants. 
                                                 
 
 
 
